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AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN CEO CHARACTERISTICS, STRATEGY, AND
PERFORMANCE FOR DECLINING ORGANIZATIO S

II

Pe1er A. S1amv1ck

Upper Echelon Theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) posits that 1dent1licat1on ol
managcnal background charactcnst1 cs can help cxplam the type of strategy selected by the
firm, wluch directly mflucnccs the performance level of the organ1Lat1on. Although pornons
of the theory have been empmcally tested (e.g., Norbum & Birley. 1988: Thomas &
Ramaswamy, 1989), no study has applied the Upper Echelon Theory to, nor tested ii 111.
turnaround snuauons.
T he intent of this study 1s I) to use Upper Echelon Theory and available cmpmcal
evidence to hypothesi, e managerial and strategy differences between lirms that do. and
those that do not. succcs~,fully turnaround and 2) to empirically exammc the'><! hypothc,1,cd
differences. This study 1s designed to answer two research qucst1ons: I) what arc the
functional backgrounds of CEOs of orgamlat1ons that have succcsslull) turned around''·
and 2) what type of turnaround strategics will yield a higher inc1dcn~e ol succcsslul
turnarounds? The answer 10 these two research questions can help practitioners 111 tM)
areas. The lirst area 1s the 1dcnt1licat1on of potcnual CEO candidates. The result, ol the
study -.v1ll show what kmd ol funwonal background 1s necessary 111 order •o 11nplcmcnt an
clfewve turnaround strategy. The second area that this stud) will benclit pracut1oncr, 1,
111 the 1dent1licat1on or the spcc11ic turnaround strategic, that arc needed by orga111,:it1on,
that arc attempung to turn around their declining performance.
The Chief Executive Olliccr (CEO) has been com,1dered a dom1n:mt lorce 111 the
dec1s1on making process ol an orgam,at1on (Beauy & Z.1_i:1c. 1987): hO\\,e,er. onl) rec.:.:ntl)
has rescarch -.v1th111 the strategic management licld exammed the CEO. D;1lton and Kc,ni:r
s1,uc that CEOs "...arc the mdl\lduals responsible and accountabk !or (the lirm\) acuom
or reactions. In most organ11at1ons. the central concept or the business -,cem, to originate
w1th the CEO" (1985:749).
As a result. the CEO determines what kind ol perspective, will be 1m:luded 111 the
dec1s1on making process. Thomas and McDaniel (1990) e\tentl the work or Ilambnd,
( 1987) by considering the mlluencc the CEO can have on the 1ntcrprctat1on of strategic
issues. Thomas and McDarncl state" ... a CEO prnnaril) interpret, strateg1L issues .md ,Kl'
to coahgn the strategy, structure. and em1ronment ol the orga111,at1on to address tho-,c
1nterpretat1ons" (1990:288). As a result, the CEO controls the dec1s1011 m:1k111g process
wnhrn the top management team. "Past work has shown that hm~ the top manager (CEO)
perceives a strategic issue affects the range ot soluuon~ cons1t.lercd 111 an orga1111at1on.
111l1ue1m:s the amount or resources comnutted to a particular pm.1ect, and allcus the sters
made toward organ1,at1onal change" (Thomas & McDaniel 1990:288).
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UPPER ECHELON THEORY

Hambrick and Mason (I 984) claim that bounded rauonalny (March & Simon, 1958)
limits the ability of top managers 10 make complex s1ra1eg1c decisions based on purely a
techno-economic basis. As a result, Hambnck and Mason (1984) propose that strategic
choices made by !Op managers must reflect their own 1d1osyncras1es. Therefore, they
propose that specific managerial charactens11cs influence the type of strategic choices made
by the firm which in tum affects the performance of the orgam,ation. Hambrick and
Mason's (1984) Upper Echelon Theory 1dent1fies the rclat1onsh1p l:'ctween managerial
charactens11cs, the type of strategy chosen by the top managers, and the subsequent
performance level of the firm.
Hambrick and Mason (I 984) 1den11ficd a numrcr or ot,scrvable upper echelon
charactenst1cs. They are 1) age, 2) funcuonal tracks. 3) other career experiences, 4)
education, 5) socioeconomic roots, 6) financial pos111on, and 7) heterogeneny of the senior
managers. They propose that funcuonal oockground. however. 1s " ..of greatest a priori
interest" (Hambrick & Mason, 1984: 1%) when considering how managerial characteristics
influence the type of strategy selected. Also, Jarym1s,yn. Clark and Summers claim that
"...previous (func11 onal) expenence may influence the CEO's choice of priorities,
interpretauon of events, style of operation. areas or emphasis and blind spots" (I 985: I 18).
Further. a CEO's functional experience can play a cnucal role in the successful
1mplementat1on of corporate strategy (Gupta. 1984). Smee the rclauonsh1p l:'ctween CEO
functional lxlckground and orgam ,at1onal performance has the strongest conceptual and
empirical t,asc (Song, I982; H111, Ireland, & Paha. I 982; Hamt,nck. I983; Chaganu &
Sambharya, I987; Norbum & Bnley. I988) or the observable charac1enst1cs presented by
Hambrick and Mason (1984), this study will consider, m part, how the functional
background or the CEO influences the type or strateg)- chosen and the subsequent
performance of the firm.
IMPACT OF CEO CHARACTERISTICS O THE TYPE OF TURNAROUND
STRATEGY CHOSE

As part of 1he1r Upper Echelon Theory, Hambrick and Mason (1984) propose that
managerial functional charac1enst1cs can influence the type or strategy selected by the
orgamzauon. They (1984) separate functional tracks into three different segments: I) output
func11ons. 2) throughput functions, and 3) peripheral runcuons. They propose that CEOs
with output functional backgrounds (e.g., markeung, sales, and product research and
development ) focus on strategies that encourage growth and the search for new
opponumues ancVor markets, while, 1f a CEO has a throughput funcuonal background (e.g.,
produa.ion, process engrneenng), he/she will focus on strategics that improve the efficiency
of the organ11at1on. If a CEO has a peripheral funcuonal background (e.g., law, finance,
general admin1strat1on, accounting). then the orgamnu on 1s more likely to" ... pursue
strategies that fit wnh their relative deficiencies m 'hands-on' experience" (Hamhnck &
-24-

Spring t997

r,

Mason 1984: 199) such as unrelated diversification.
Datta and Guthrie (I 994) state that the functional background of the CEO is imponam
in resolving critical issues facing the organization. The CEO relies on his/her expertise in
interpreting the viable solution LO organizational problems. Waller, Huber, and Glick (1995)
also found that the funcuonal background of top executives impacts how the executives
perceive organizational issues. Waller et al. ( 1995) discovered that functional background
influences the level of organizational effectiveness based on how feasible the CEO believes
that orgaruzauonal change strategies can be implemented. Wiersema and Bame! (I 992) also
proclaim the 1mponance of the charactenstics of top level executives by discovering that
the functional background of top level executives impacts the level of strategic change
within an orgamza11on. Gunz and Jalland (1996) also state the functional background of
the CEO is cntical since It could impact the way that intended strategies are implemented.
In two emp1ncal studies that examined the relationship between managerial functional
background and the type of strategy chosen, both Chaganll and Sambharya (1987) and
Norburn and Birley (1988) found that organizations that 1mplcmentcd a high growth
strategy had top managers wnh output funcuonal backgrounds. Thomas, Lnschcn and
Ramaswamy (1991) also found a pos1t1ve relauonsh1p between high growth strategics and
output funcuonal background of top executives. Thomas et al. (1991) concluded that CEOs
pursue competiuve strategies that correspond wnh their functional background. Smee high
growth strategies would include the expansion mto new products and/or markets, ll 1s
proposed that a CEO with an output funcuonal background would implement turnaround
strategics when attempting to tum around the dcclmmg performance of the firm. Therefore,
the first hypothesis to re empmcally tested 1s:
Hypothesis I:

Fmns wnh CEOs wllh an output funcuonal background will have more
inc1dcnces of using turnaround strategies than operauonal turnaround
strategies.

Thomas et al. ( 1991) found that CEOs wllh a throughput functional background
fon1sctl on effiaenc:y issues. Based on their expenencc m cngmccnng and/or the production
processes. CEOs wllh a throughput functional background are fam1ltar wllh the
manufacturing process and will seek ways to turn around the orgam1auon based on
clfa., ency measures. This r.clicf 1s supported by RaJagopalan and Datta ( 1996) who found
that CEOs with a throughput funrnonal background arc more prevalent m mdustnes wnh
high levels of capital mtensny smcc the CEOs can effectively manage these orgamzat1ons
with efficiency based strategics. These eflic,cncy measures could include cost and asset
reducuon strategies that arc catcgon,cd as operational turnaround strategies. Therefore. ll
1s proposed that a CEO wllh a throughput funcuonal background would implement
operauonal turnaround strategies m order to reverse the dechnmg performance of the firm.
Therefore, a second hypothesis to be empmcally tested 1s:

Sowhun Busmtss Rel'itw
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Hypothesis 2:

Firms with CEOs with a throughput functional background will have
more incidences of using operational turnaround strategies than strategic
turnaround strategies.

As was stated previously, CEOs with a peripheral functional background do not have
"hands-on" business experience 10 help guide their strategic decision making process. As
a result, they have not had the experience of developing new products and/or markets nor
have they had experience in evaluating the efficiency based 1s ues that an organization must
address. D'Aveni (1989) found that the managerial charactenstics of executives in bankrupt
firms had a higher incidence of peripheral funcuonal backgrounds.
A potential explanation as to why the firms eventually went bankrupt is that the CEO
of the bankrupt firms may not have the experience and ex peruse LO 1mplemem the necessary
operational and strategic turnaround strategies in order LO reverse the firm's declining
performance (D'Aveni, I989). Therefore, it is proposed that organizations with an output
or throughput CEO will te more successful in turrung around the organizauon than a CEO
with a peripheral functional background. Therefore, a 1h1rd hypothesis 10 te empincally
tested is:
Hypothesis 3:

Firms that have experienced a successful turnaround will have a lower
incidence of penpheral funcuonal backgrounds than firms that did not
experience a successful turnaround.

TYPE OF TURNAROU D STRATEGY CHOSEN AND THE SUBSEQUENT
PERFORMANCE 01• THE
FIRM
Turnaround strategics can be separated based on whether they are considered
operauonal or strategic in nature (Schendel & Patwn, 1976; Schendel, Patton, & Riggs.
I976; Hofer, I980). Schendel and Patton (1976) define operauonal strategies as those
strategies that focus on increasing the efficiency of the existing organiLauon that include
such aa.ions as asset and/or cost reduction. Strategic turnaround strategies focus on shifts
in the overall strategy of the organ1Lation that could te in the form of d1vcrs1ficat1on,
product innovauon, or shifting imo new market segments (Schendel, Patton, & Riggs,
1976; Hoffman, 1989).
Previous empmcal studies have med LO determine 1f the type of turnaround strategy
selected should be based on the manager's interpretauon of the type of orgamLauonal
problems the firm faces. The research of both Schendel, Patton, and Riggs (1976) and Hofer
(1980) propose that if an operauonal (strategic) problem 1s causing the orgamlat10nal
decline, then an operauonal (s1ra1eg1c) turnaround strategy 1s required.
When Schendel, Patton, and Riggs (1976) examined declining firms that did tum
around, they found that although a maJonty of the firms they studied declined due to
operauonal problems, a maJonty of the dechning firms selected strategic turnaround
-26-

Sprmg 1997

solutions in order to resolve the problem.
In their longnudinal study, Schreuder, Yan Cayseele, and De Graaff (1991) matched
21 successful and unsuccessful firms and found that the successful firms followed market
oriented (strategic) strategies while unsuccessful firms focused on cost rcducuon
(operauonal) strategics. A parual explanauon given was that the unsuccessful fi rms had 10
focus on costs since they were imually in a less favorable financial position.
Hofer (1980) found that firms selected operaung turnaround strategies even when the
problems facing the firm were considered strategic in nature. Even though a majonty of the
firms selected an operaung turnaround strategy. of the ten firms studied, only three
increased both sales and profits after 1mplcmenung a turnaround strategy. All three or
those firms implemented both opcraung and strategic turnaround strategies.
B1rcauJ1 (I 982) proposes that five scqucnual steps are needed in order lO tum around
declining organuauons. The first step needed 10 turnaround a decl111ing orgamrn11on 1s the
replacement of scruor management. Only with the replacement of the top management team
would the orgamzauon bc able lO implement the type of turnaround strategics needed in
order lO tum around the orgaruzauon (Chan, 1993). The second step 1s an evaluauon stage
in which the new scruor managers 1dcnufy the problems and soluuons necessary lO help the
firm recover. The third step 1s the emergency stage in which senior management mes to
"stop the bleeding." This 1s when short-term operauonal strategies are implemented in the
form ol cost cutting and asset reducuon (Winn 1993). The fourth step 1s the stab1hzauon
stage in which management looks bcyond current immediate issues that effect the shortterm sufVlval ot the orgarn,ation. IL1s dunng this stage that n:posiuomng the organi,auon
into new markets or the development or new products 1s considered to provide
orgamrnuonal growth. Thi.: last stage occurs when the firm returns lO "normal" growth
levels.
D'Avem (1989) i.:xtends the work of 81beault (1982) by companng the charactcnsucs
of firms that have goni.: bankrupt wuh non-bankrupt firms. D'Avem (1989) matched 49
bankrupt firms wuh 49 survivors. D'Avi.:m (1989) found that tirms that evi.:ntually went
bankrupt have a higher incidence of liquidauon and dJvcsuture. The bankrupt firms also
did not locus on new product hni.:s or move into different markets. Therefore, he concludes
that the bankrupt firms pnmanly focused on opcraung strategics in attempung to tum
around the orga1111:i1ion. D'Avcm (1989) does acknowledge the value that operaung
turnaround strategics can have in the shon-term by hclp111g the dcchmng firm buy "lime"
LO help reverse the orgamz.auonal decline: however, he conunucs by staling that downslllng
and clliticm:y measures arc not enough for a ti rm 10 tum around. This downward spiral of
at'!Jons (Harnhnck & D'Avem, 1988) by orgam 1.auons has been supported b:r tud1es from
Moulton and Thomas ( 1993) and Daily ( 1996).
Dechning firms need to implement strategic turnaround strategics so that the
orgam,auon can move into a more "favorable environment." D'Avem (1989) states that a
fundamental problem facing dechmng organ1Lat1ons 1s that they arc fa1hng in their current
market segments. As a result, failing firms need to move into different environmental
domains in order to survive in the future (Miles. Coleman, & Creed, 1995).
Soulhern Busmess Review
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D'Aveni (I 989) warns that the exclusive use of operational turnaround strategies could
tecome pan of the problem for the declining organization, since the shon-term increases
in performance due 10 the implementation of opcra11onal strategies may convince top
management that the organizati on is turning around even though these increased
performance levels are only temporary. He continues by Stating that these shon-term
increases in performance due LO operational turnaround strategies may hinder the long-term
survival of the organization since the managers may not think that n 1s necessary to
consider strategies that would move the organilallon mto a new domain. Therefore, a
founh hypothesis to be empirically te ted 1s:
Hypothesis 4:

Firms that have experienced a successful turnaround will have a higher
incidence of using both strategic and opcrauonal turnaround strategies
than using primarily strategic or operational turnaround strategies.

Research Design

RESEARCH METHOD

The research de. ign for this study was based on a matched-pair design (Schwanz &
Menon, 1985; Hambnck & D'Averu, 1988; and D'Avern, 1989). In this study, the matched
pai r de 1gn was used to compare firms that were dechnmg and were able lO successfully
turn around with firms that were not successful m turning around. The data were collected
on a yearly basis for three different ume penods: 1970-1979, 1976-1985, and 1980-1989.
The length of orgarnlallonal decline and turnaround lime periods studied was three
years. (Hoffman, 1989). With.in these three, ten-year ume frames to be m111ally included m
the Study, all firms m the study must have had m111ally experienced three years of decline
within the first five years (e.g., 1970-1974, 1976-1980, 1980-1984).
The firms were then matched wllhtn the same ume frames based on those that
conunued to decline for a subsequent three years versus those firms that turned around
dunng the subsequent five years (e.g., 1975-1979, 1981-1985, 1985-1989). The selection
of a ten-year penod allowed for some minor dev1a11ons m the specific decline and
turnaround patterns. As a result, the decline and turnaround patterns of the orgarnzauon
did not have to be based on consecuuve years (Schendel & Patton, 1976).
Three judges worked independently lO match firms that were declining with similar
firms that were successfully turned around. The organ11a11ons were matched on sirrnlarny
of lines of businesses so that s-peafic industry effects were neutraliled. The Judges were also
given the sales levels of the firms under cons1dera11on for match mg. As was the case with
D'Averu (1989), the independent Judges decided on "smular" sales levels. The firms were
matched on sales levels since the size of the firm can impact the strategic choices available
to the firm. As a result, the size of the firm (based on annual sales) was comrolled m this
study. If at least two of the three Judges agreed on the match pair, those two firms were
included in the sample.
The Kappa statistic was used to examine the inter-rater agreement among the Judges.
-28-
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The Kappa statistic value of 11.37 meant that the probability that the agreement made by
the judges could have rccn based on chance alone was less than 0.01. A listing of the firms
used in this study 1s presented in the Appendix along with their sales ranges and their lines
of businesses.
Measures

In order to emp1r1cally test the relat1onsh1ps presented m thi s study. a number of key
constructs needed to be o~rauonah,ed.
Identilication of the CEO

The 1dcnuticauon 0C1he CEO 1s rosed on the class1licat1on given by V1rany. Tushm:m,
and Romanelli (1985). II a person wnh1n the organ11auon had the tllle of ch1el cxecut1\e
otliccr (CEO). that person was selected as the CEO. For orgamrnuons that did not have a
person With the 11tle ot CEO. the chair of the Board was selected as the top cxccuuve. If the
orgam, auon did not have a CEO or chair of the Board. the president of the orga111,at1 on
was selected as the top exccuuve.
Functional

lanagcrial Characteri<,tics

Thi.! opaauonah,ation of the CEO functional background charac1cns11,, ,,as based on
an adaptation ol the deti11111ons given by Hamhm:k :md Mason (198-1).
Output Functional Background,

The output lunll1 onal h:Kkgrounds mduded Marketmg. Saks. and Product Re\Carch
and Development.
Throughput Functional Backgrounds

The throughput lunrnonal txu.:kground, mduded Producuon and Prncc" Engmecnng.
Peripheral Func tional Backgrounds

Thi.! peripheral lunwonal
Adm1111strat1on. :md An:ounung.

backgrounds mdudcd

LJ,~.

Finance.

Gcncr:11

Multi-functional Background

The mult1-tunwonal background 1m:luded General Manager. Founder o~n;.:r.
Controlled SBU or Conglomerate.

Although Hambrick and Mason (1984) identified three maJor classifications of
functional backgrounds (output, throughput, and peripheral), they failed to take into
consideration managers with multi-functional backgrounds. Hambrick and Mason admit
that the chief executive is likely to be a generalist (i.e., have experience m many areas), yet
they failed 10 identify this type of background experience. Thi s classification (Multifunctional Background) included: I) CEOs who arc the founder and/or owner of the firm,
2) CEOs with multiple functional backgrounds, 3) CEOs who have controlled a business
unit within the organization before becommg the CEO, and 4) CEOs who have controlled
multiple businesses (conglomerates) before becoming the CEO.
For this study, Dun and Bradstreet's Reference Guide of Corporate Management
and promotional announcements from The Wall Street Journal were used to determine
the different functional experiences the CEO has had based on the previous J0b Illies that
the CEO has held. The dommant funcuonal background of the CEO tor this study was
calculated based on the h1ghe t numb.:r of years w1thm a lunmonal area w1thm the most
recent IOyears of work experience.
Twenty-four of the classificauons were verified by comparing the class1ficat1on of the
CEOs funcuonal background lxlsed on pre\'10us Job titles with the class1ficat1ons presented
in Business Week's Annual Survey of the Top I 000 CEOs and Forbes' Annual Survey of
the Top 800 CEOs. All 24 of the class11icauons based on mlormat1on presented by Business
Weck and Forbes matched the class1ficauons based on previous _10!:1 titles.
Organizational Decline and Organi.~,1tional Turnaround

One of the performance measurement tcchmqucs presented 11) Chakravarthy ( 1986)
to measure organiLallonal dcdme and turnaround 1s the Altman Z scores. Altman (I 968,
1971 ) dtscovered a combmauon of five ratios that nest demonstrates the ahilit)' to predict
corporate bankruptcy. Those five ratios arc workmg capital total assets. retamcd
earnmgs/total assets. earnings hcfore interest and taxcvtotal assets, market value of
equ1ty/book value of total debt. and salc~total assets.
In this study, a firm was considered to he dcdmmg 1f the Z srnre was dccreasmg for
at least three years and the Z value was less than 3.0 for each ol the 3 1cars. A firm was
considered to be tummg around 11 the firm has hccn determined to he m1l1Jlly m dccl1m:
and the subsequent Z value was mcreasmg for each year and was equal to or excccdmg the
value of 3.0 for at least the last year of the J years ol organ11auonal turnaround.
Type of Turnaround Strategics

The data used to measure the type of turnaround strategics chosen h)' the firm were
obtamed from variables available from Compus1a1 Data Files.
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Operational Turnaround Strategics
Cost reduction strategies. Hoffman (1989) defines cost reduction strategies as those
strategies that result in the reduction of: I) personnel, 2) inventory levels, 3) accounts
receivables, and 4) operating expenses within an organization in order to increase
operating efficiency. The measurement of cost reduction strategies was as follows: I)
reduction of number of employees within the firm, 2) reduction in inventory levels. 3)
decrease in accounts rece1vable, and 4) decrease in operating expenses based on the
reducuon of the cost of goods sold by the firm.
Asset reduction strategies. Hoffman (I 989) defines asset reducuon strategies as the
eliminauon of plant and/or equipment in order to improve operaung efficiency. The
measurement of asset rcducuon SIIategies was based on the reduction of the ending balance
of the property. plant and equ1 pment account of the firm.
Strategic Turnaround Strategies

Strategic turnaround strategies have been defined as the use of dl\ers1ficauon.
introducuon of new products and/or expanding into new markets, and exning ex1sung
markets in order to strateg1cally rcposiuon the organizau on (Schendel, Patton, & Riggs.
1976: Hofer. 1980: Hoffman, 1989). Hambrick (1983) operauonah,ed the strategic or
"cntrepreneunal" oncntauon of firms by cons1denng the level of research and development
and markeung expense that arc used by the firm as a percentage of total sales of the firm.
As a result, the measurement of strategic turnaround tra1eg1cs was based on I) the level
of research and development expense. 2) the level of adven1s111g expense, 3) the level of
acqu1siuons that were implemented by the firm, and 4) the value of discontinued operauons
of the firm.
Calculauon of the values of the nine van ables was txiscd on the percentage of change
from the first year and the sixth year of the decline or dcclinc, turnaround pattern. In th1
study, the increasing or dccreasmg patterns of the \anables 111d1cated whether the firm was
using operauonal. strategic. or both types of turnaround strategies in order to reverse the
decilning performance trend.
This formula was used to deterrrune \~hether there was a percentage incn:asc or
dee.Tease in trus variable over the six years of decline or decline turnaround. An exception
to this calculauon was made for two of the vanables-<l1scounted operauons and
acqu1s1uons. Due to the nature of thc-e variables. value, for thc;;c variables do nOt occur
cont111uously (every year) so the percentage values were calculated based on the add1tton of
the percentage values over the six year performance pattern.
Based on a preVJous <;1udy by Hambnck and Schecter (1983), cluster analysis was used
on these nine variables to determine 1fthe firms were us111g pnmanly operauonal, strategic.
or a combinauon of lx)th strategies 111 order to help turnaround the organ11auon.
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Sample

The sample of firms for Lhis study was obtained from Compustat Data fi les. The total
population of firms listed on Lhe New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock
Exchange available on Compustat was 2,252 lirms. Data were collected on an annual basis
from the years I970 to 1989. The sample size for this study was 39 matched pairs (78
firms), which is within the statistical power lirruts denved by Cohen at the 0.01 level.

RESULTS
Description of the Data

The descriptive statisuc of the data can be seen m Tables I and 2. In Table I, 1t can
be 9::en that of the rune strategy vanables, six had on!) small or moderate ranges m values
(e.g., EMPLY, AREC, OPEX, RD, ADEX, ACQ), while three of the vanables had
considerable ranges with fairly large standard dev1auons (e.g., !NV, PPE and DO).
Table I
Descripti,c Stati,tics
Variable

\lean

EMPLY

0.2835

I\IV

td De,.

\lorumurn

\taximum

0.3409

-0 5880

0.9290

-0.3027

3.0457

-26.1250

0.8860

AREC

-0. 1470

0.7 92

-5 i820

0.8420

OPEX

-0.0403

0.3354

I 9510

05410

PPE

-0.7601

2 2 1s~

-13.0690

0.7500

DO

0.7461

5.4669

0 .0000

48.3560

RD

0.0280

0.2747

-0 7500

1.5670

ADEX

00674

02280

-0 2000

I 7000

ACQ

0.0910

02409

0.0000

1.6360

LEGEND
EMPLY lt,;V
AREC
OPEX
PPE
DO

RD
ADEX
ACQ
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PERCENT CHA\/GE IN NL'M0ER or I MPLOYH:.S
PERCE\IT OlA'>GE l:S It-. VENTORY LLVLt-5
PERCEKT OtANGE l:S ACCOUNTS RECEIV /\BLE
PERCENT 0-tANGE IN OPERATING EXPENSES
PERCENT OIANGE It-. ENDING BALANCt Of' PROPl:.RTY. PI.A'ff A.'D EQLI P\.1ENT
PERCENT CHA'>GE IN VALll, OF DISCOL'Nl ED OPERATIO., s
PERCENT OtANGE IN RESEAROI AND D£:VELOPMFNT EXPENSES
PERCENT O IANGE IN ADVERTISING EXPENSE
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An examinauon of the correlations of the vanables (Table 2) shows a significant
posiuve relationship rerwecn the numt-er of employees and property, plan!, and_eq~ipment.
A significant inverse relationship between inventory levels and level ol acquisn1ons also
exists.
In addition, a significant poswve relauonsh1p octween the performance trend of the
!inn (decline/turnaround) and the numrer of employees and plant, property, and equipment
and an inverse relauonslup with discounted operat1ons can t-c -,cen. Throughput functional
background is inversely related to inventory levels. and pcn pheral lunct1onal background
1s po n1vely related to property, plant and equipment.
Table 3 shows a lirruted variance on the rclat1onsh1p rctween type of CEO functional
background and the perfonnance trend of the organ11 at1on. However, 1t 1s intcrcsung to
note that 42.8% of the firms (21 firms) in which the founder 1s running the firm were able
to successfully tum around.
The first and second hypotheses dealt wnh the relat1onsh1p rctwcen funcuonal
background of the CEO and the type of turnaround stratcg; implemented. In order 10 test
these hypotheses, the class1ficat1on of the different types of strategies had to occur.
Hierarchical clustering was used in order to determine 1f the firms were usmg primarily
operauonal, strategic, or a combmauon of both strategies in order 10 help tum around the
organizauon.
Five potenual clusters were 1mt1ally considered. 01 the live p0ient1al clusters. two of
the potenual clusters were single observations. To accommodate the mclus1on of these
outliers m sub<-equcnt analyses, these two single observations w..:re mcludcd in the cluster
1hat had the most s1rrular charactensucs (Cluster J). As a result, three dominant clusters
were generated usmg Ward's rrummum variance method.
A MA OVA test u mg Wilks' cri terion, Pllla1's Trace Jnd Hotelling-Lawley Trace
yielded PR > F = 0.001. Therefore. n can re concluded that there were s1gmficant
differences among the clusters. Since the o,erall MANO\A test \\:IS s1gmficant. Tukc;
pa1r-w1sc mean comparisons were used to further 1dcnt1fy 1mportJnt tl1ffcrences retwecn
the three clusters (Table 5). The important tl1tfcrences rctween the dusters were used to
larel and classify each cluster's associated stratel!)
Interpretation of the Clu5ter
Clw.tcr I. Cluster I could re considered as representing firms that employ t,mh strategic
and operauonal turnaround strategics. As can oc seen from Tables 4 and 5, Cluster I had
higher means than CluSter 2 for all rune van ables and had higher means than Cluster 3 on
three operauonal vanables (two of which were s1gmficantly tl1tlcrent) and two of the
strategic variables.
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Table 3
CEO Func tio nal IJac kµround and Dcclinc/furnaround Firms
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Clu.tcr 2. Clw,1cr 2 could r.c cons1dcn::d as rcrrc...:nung tirm, that rnmanl} u...:
opcra11onal turnaround s1ra1eg1cs. Cluster 2 could
1nterrrctcd 1h1s \hi}- since II has
sigrulicamly higher means than Cluster 3 lor two opcrauonal strategy vanat>le, and has a
stausucally s1g1111icantl} lower mean than Cluster J on 1hc stra1cg1l \ ;mat>lc. d1 sronunued
opcrauons.
Cluster 3. Cluster 3 could r.c considered as repri::scnung lirms that pnmanl 1 u\C ,1ra1cg1c
turnaround s1ra1cg1c, since Cluster J means v.ere s1g1111icantl 1 higher than Clu,1cr I ,md
Clus1er 2 for the strategic \..triable. d1sconunui::d opcrauons and sig1111iLantl 1 IO\\Cr than
Cluster I and Cluster 2 on two opcrauonal vanat>les.
Thc<,e cmpincally derived strategy class1licat1on~ w.::rc used lO .::xam1ni:: Hypotheses I
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These empi rically derived strategy classifications were used to examine Hypotheses I
and 2, which dealt with the relauonship l:etwcen the fu nctional background of the CEO and
the type of turnaround strategics selected. Although the results are nm statistically
significant (p=0.595), the results showed that 68 of the 78 fi rms (87.18%) selected both
types of strategies (combined strategy) regardless of the functional background of the CEO.
The results also showed that 40 of the 78 fi rms (62.82%) had a CEO with a Multi•
Functional background.
Hypothesis 3 dealt with the relationship l:etwccn a type of functional background
(peripheral versus non-peripheral) and the performance trend of the organization (decli ne
versus turnaround). As summamcd 111 Table 6, there are significant frequency differences
reflected 111 the Chi-Square stat1st1c at the 0.10 level (p=0.092).
Contrary to Hypothesis 3, the results show that of the 16 firms with a CEO with a
penpheral background, I I firms (68.75%) were involved 111 a successful turnaround while
only 45. I6% of the non-peripheral firms successfully turned around.
Hypothesis 4 dealt with the relat1onsh1p between the type of turnaround strategy used
by the firm and the subsequent performance of the firm (continuous decline or a successful
turnaround). The results are summanLcd 111 Table 7.
The results arc staustically significant (p=0.022) and so, Hypothesis 4 1s supported:
1.c., successfully turned around firms were ohscrved to have a higher incidence of hoth
strategic and operat1onal turnaround strategics (combined strategy) instead of the primary
use of either of the two types of turnaround strategies. Over 87 percent of all the firms 111
the sample implemented the comhmcd strategy and over 97 percent of the firms that did
successfully turn around implemented the comhmcd stratq,,y.

DISCUSS IO
Although there was n0t a sigruficant rdauonsh1p retwccn output/throughput funwonal
background and a higher use of stratcg1c/opcrat1onal turnaround strategics, the cmpmcal
tcsung of the first two hypotheses has demonstrated some interesting frequenc1cs. The use
of hoth typcs of turnaround strategies ranged from a low of 8 l .6<'1r for CEOs with a mult1funct1onal hackground to 100'1 for CEOs with an output and pcnphcral funct1onal
background.
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T able 6
Chi- quare Goodness-of-fit T est
Per ipheral/Non-Per ipher al FuncUonal Bac kgro und and Decline/Turnaround f7 rms
Dechrung Finns

Turnaround Firms

Toi.OJ

Non-Pe11pheral

34
43.59
5484
87.18

28
35.90
45.16
71.79

62
79.49

Pe11pheral

5

6.41
31 25
12.82

II
14.10
68.75
28.21

16
20 SI

Toi.OJ

39
50.00

39
50.00

78
10000

Ou-Square

df•I

Value-2.83 I

Prob-0.092

Table 7
Chi-Square Goodnes<-of-fi t r est
Type of Turnaround Strategy and Decline/furnaround hrm;

Combmcd Strategy

Strategic

Total

30
38.46
44 12
7692

38
48.72
55.88
97.44

68
7 IR

df-2

6
7 69

6.41
83 3:1
12.82

I 28
16.67
2 56

4

100.00
10 26

0
000
0.00
0.00

4
5.11

39
50.00

39
50.00

78
10000

5 1:1

To1.al
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Turnaround hnns

5

Operauonal

Ou-Square

Dechrung Finns

Value-7 608

Prob-0.022
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An explanauon for this could tx: that once CEOs are in a crisis situation, they are
prepared to consider drastic changes in their strategies in order to tum around the
organization. An0ther feasible explanation could tx: that when an organization is facing a
decli ning performance scenario, functional background may not tx: the dominant CEO
charactenstic m dctemurung the type of strategies selected to tum around the organilallon.
The CEO's length of tenure and age (Jaryrnislyn, Clark, & Summers, 1985; Thomas &
Ramaswamy. 1989; and Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990) may play a more cnucal role in
impacting the type of turnaround strategy selected. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) found
that as the tenure of the top management team increases, the orgaruzauon 1s more ltkely to
be similar in strategy to Other firms in the industry and have a performance level that 1s
close to the industry average.
In the sample of this study, the average tenure of the CEO of a declining firm was
I7.54 years, while the average length of tenure for a turnaround firm was 21.97 years.
Therefore, as the CEO's tenure increases, the CEO's experience and expenisc in handltng
decltrung performance trends may also increase. As a result, the CEO may already have
faced a decltning performance trend of the firm m the past and, therefore, could have the
experience necessary to implement the appropriate turnaround strategies.
Of course. the age or the CEO could also play a role in determining the t~ of
responses made to an orgarulallonal decltne. It could be speculated that as the CEO moves
closer to reurcment age, the CEO may be less concerned w1th trying to tum around the
organ11a11on. On the other hand, younger CEOs may be more wtlltng to try different types
of turnaround strategics m order to secure the long-term survival of the organ11a11on.
However, the impact of age on the type or turnaround strategics selected by the orgaruzat,on
can only be based on speculauon, since in this study the age of the CEO was not obtained
as pan or the data collcct1on.
Hypothesis 3 proposed that successfully turned around firms would have a higher
mL1dcnce or non-penpheral (e.g., output, throughput, and mult1-lunct1onal) CEO functional
background than peripheral CEO funct1onal background. Contrary to Hypothesis 3, the
results shO\~ that over s1xty-e1ght percent of CEOs wtth pcnpheral backgrounds were
involved in successful turnarounds while only 45.16% of CEO~ wtth non-peripheral
backgrounds were s1mtlarly involved. The explanat1on for this could oc that CEOs under
cnsis cond1t1ons may consider alternauve plans of acuon that may not be considered under
stable condmons. As was stated prcv1ously, under cnsts condJuons, the CEO may oc more
willing to accept recommendat1ons from top management team mcmocrs with other
luncuonal hackground cxpencncc on the future course of the orgaru1.ation.
An alternative explanauon could be in the charactenst1cs of the pcnphcral functional
background. In thts study, peripheral functional back.ground has bccn defined as having
funcuonal experience m finance. law, accounting. or adrrurustrat1on. As a result, the type
ol training these CEOs have experienced in the past may affect how decision making
occurs m the top level of management. Experience in pen pheral funcuonal areas may give
the CEO necessary experience in coordinauon of departments and people as well as the
abtltty to be a good negouator. As a result, the high level of expenence m coordination and
Sourhern Business Rev1th
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negooauon ma; give the CEOs ncce sary ~lls to delegate respons1b1hues to people wnhm
the top management team. In addi uon, the CEO may not personally have the functional
ex perience to 1denufy the proper strategic moves that the orgam,auon must implement.
However, the CEO can 1dcnufy and ncgouate wnh the top level managers who can make
the nccessarydecls1ons and the CEO cant\: elfecuve in coordinaung the efforts of the top
management team that could lead to a reversing of the declining performance trend of the
orgamzauon.
Hypothesis 4 dealt with the relauonsh1r h:t\\l.'Cn the type of turnaround strategy
implemented by the firm and the subsequent pcrformancc of the firm. It was hYrQthcs11cd
that successfully turned around firms would 1mrlcmcnt a combinauon of both opcrat1onal
and strategic turnaround strategics. The results sh l\\ that this h;pithcs1s \\Js supponcd.
A vast ma.JOntyof the firm., (87.18'.lt) 1mrll:mcn1cd nmh types ol turnaround strategics
and 97.44'x of the firms that did successfully tum ar-1und used t\ 1th types if strategics.
Only one firm was able to successfully tum around using primarily one type ol turnaround
Slrategy (opcrauonal).
Therefore. n could h: concluded that the ulumatc goal ol dcdin111g firms 1s to
reposu1on themselves into new markets. industnes. and,or to introduu: new products.
Based on the results of this study, n could h: suggested that the \\;J) to ::ich1C\C that g,,JI 1s
to u<;c opcrauonal turnaround ,trateg1cs to '\top the blccd111g" and stabil11e the
orgaru,.iuon a.s B1h:auh (19 2) suggests. The llrm then needs tn 1dcnt1I; nC\\ market areas
to focus on since. as D'Avem (1989) stJtcs. the primar; reason the firms :ire dcdining 111
the first place 1s that the; an: l..uhng 111 th1:1r lUrrent markt:t St:gmcnts.
As a result. It could h: suggesied that tht: recmer) ol a dedining orgam,at •n s based
on a lock-step procedure 111 wh1<.:h a comb111a11on ol both opcrat1 011al and strategic
turnaround Slrateg1cs an: nec.:cssar; 111 >rdcr to re\ersc the dcL in ng pcrlormanLe trend It
could h: s-pxulated that smt'C almost 88', ol all lirms 111 the samrle used a comb111a11on of
hoth turnaround Slratcg1es and C\er; successlull; turned around lirm \\Ith one e.\CCpllon
used a combma11on of both types of tumar,iund ,1rateg1c,. the use ol t\•1h turnar'lund
strategics ma; h: a "common sense" solu11on for firms attempung to turnaround. As a
result, the "common -.:me" approach t,) dealing with the llrm\ declining pert ,rmanLc ma;
take pn:ccdencc over the type of tunc11 onal tra111111g the CEO hJs had in the past \s a
result. regardle~s ot the funwonal batkground ol CfO. the CLO \\ ,uld implement a
comtmauon of txxh t}P,:\ of turnaround strategics ,111,e It St:ems ti nc the onl) \ 1able wa)
to reverse the decl111111g pcrtormance ol the orgam,at10n.
LIMITATIO SAND SUGGESTIO S FOR FUTURI- RFSFA RCII
A pnmary l11rutauon of tlus study 1s the ,;ample s11c. Although all purihd; traded firms
lrom 1970 to 1989 were 1m11ally 111clud1:d 111 the sample, only 39 matched pairs were
derived 111 which '1rrular s11c and 111dustr; charactensucs of dcd111111g llrms could h:
matched wah firm.~ that have turned around Although the final sample s11c was w11h111 the
m1111mum range suggestt:d b} Cohen (1977) for domg Chi-Square analysis Jt J p=0.01
-4().
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significance level, addiLtonal firm 111 the sample would have increased the power of the
analysis, increased the confidence in the results, increased the generalizab1li1y, and could
have led LO more s1g111fican1 resul ts.
Another limnaLton of the study 1s 11s scope. Although the CEO 1s considered the
dominant force in the dec1s1on mak111g process and could lx: considered a dorrunant factor
in the exam111auon of the relauonsh1p lx:1ween managerial characteristics, strategy. and
performance (e.g. Song. 1982), research has 1dent11ied other factors such as governance
tructure (Goodste111 & Bocker, 1991 ). other managerial charac1eris11cs such as age and
tenure (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), culture (Barney, 1986: Wilk111s & Ouchi. 1983).
administrauve mechamsms. (Frednckson, 1986) and the top management team (Hamhrick
& Mason, 1984: Hambnck, 1987: Finkel~1e111 & Hamhrick. 1990) that rnuld 111J1uence the
type of strategic dec1s1ons enacted. Therefore. a lim11at1on of 1h1s study \,as th:11 these
additional factors were not 111cluded 111 exarrumng the relat1onsh1p t>ctween managerial
charac1crisuc,, strategy. and performance.
An adctitwnal lim11a11on ol tlus study was nm exam1111ng the Jntecedcnt cond111ons that
created the organJ1a11onaJ dccl111e. Cameron and ZammulO ( 1983) 1dc11111ied d11tcn:nt 1y1.:s
oforganJ1a11onal decl111e rosed on changes 111 the orga1111a11on's em1ronmi.:m Jnd chJngc,
in the firm's 111che s11c and shape. However. Cameron and Zammuto (1983) claim that
regardless of the antecedents of the orgam,allonal decline. the type of managerial rcsromc
can t>c class11ied 11110 l\, O maJor types-short-term ae110n, (opera11on;il turnaround
s1ra1eg1es) and long-term adjustments (s1ra1eg1L tunuround s1r;iteg1es). The .intecedents ol
organ11a11onal decl111e could have a s1g1111icant impact on the type ot wrnarnund s1ra1ci::1c,
selected hy the tirm :111d the suhscquent perlormance lc\el
One area 111 which future n:'-t:arch could he done 1, the cxam111aw,n of \\h) ccna111
finm that used tx11h types ol strategics tatled 10 turn around\\ htlc other 1irms were ,1hlc Ill
successfully re\ersc their dcd111mg trend One e,rlanatwn could he th.it ccn.11n tyre, ,it
op.:rauonal and. or str:J1eg1L turnaround strategics arc more cnt1L.il 111 order 10 turnaround
the orga1111a11on (..:.g.. rcdurn1g physical as'-Cts PPE \Crsus cttic1c1ic) g:11ns OPEX). r\, .1
result, rcgrc,swn analys1, could he done on these \.tnJhlc, 10 sec 11 there .m: cnt1i:al
\anatilcs that need to t>c ad_1u,1cd 111 order 10 1urn around the decl1n111g orga1111:111011.
Another expl,ma11on 1, the antecedent rnnd111ons or the lirm A, SL11rcudcr. \ an Cayseclc
and De Graatf (1991) disc l\Crcd. the 1mt1al cond111,ms f.1ung the tirin. 111 pan. heir
determine the ahd11y <ll the tirrn to successfully 1urn arnund .\ future ,1ud) LOuld c,ammc
the antecedent cond111on, nl the firm w sec 1f they h;1vc ,1 ,1gn1liLan1 1mpan on the type <ll
turnaround ,1ra1eg1c, selected hy the tirm and the suhscqucnt rcrtorm:mcc lc\CI. Thi, ,1ud)
could aucmpt lO cmpmLally suppon Cameron and Z11nmu10', l I9X3) cl.um th.n reg,1rdle"
ol the antecedents of the orga1111a11on\ dcclmc, opera11on.d turnaround ,1ra1cg1cs .ire
needed 111 the shon-term .ind ,1ra1cg1L turnaround ,tratcg1c, ,ire nccJcJ m the long-term.
In adctiuon. future research could also compare the rcl.11i1msh1ps presented 111 1h1, stud)
using data from txllh putihcly .rnd pnvatcly, held firms 10 sec 1I any or the n:la1inn,l11p, an:
s1g1111ica111ly different. It could he speculated that pm ately held ti rim may hcl\C a higher
111cidcncc or foundcrS1 loundcr's families controlling the orga1111a11on than puhhd) held
Southern
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orgaruz:uions. U tlus 1s the c-.ise. ll would 1:'c interesting to examine how these pn va1cly held
comparucs try to reverse their declining pertormance trend \\ hen CEO suc<.:ess1on 1s not a
vi able soluuon. It ma) also l:'c interesting to rnmpare the 11me of the turnaround m
performance ofpubhcly held and pnvately held firms ,mre pmately held t1rms may not rc
under a '\hon-term" 11me trame 10 reverse the dedmmg pert ,rmance trend that puhhcl)
held companies muM deal wuh. As a result. it rnuld I'.\! sp.:rnlated th.It pma1ely held
companies may ha\ e a longer time-frame m \\h1d1 lO reverse he dcLhning rcrtormance
trend as compared with publicly held companies. There rnuld .ii so~ d1lfrrem:cs In the type
ot wmaround ,1ra1cg1cs ~lcc1ed h) pubhcl) held \Crsu, pm .tlel) held tir'lls.
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APPE DIX
1970-1979 Matched Pa irs
a les Range
(M ill$)

Type
D

F1rm
Patrick Petroleum

DT

Parker Dnllmg

27.J05

D

Coyinon Rcsourre,

2-15

OilGa, hplor. RcJI Estote

DT

Dcllu lntemat,onal

5-18

011 .ind Gas E.plor

117,193

Cement. CcJlmr Board. L.1nd IN>elop

Cemt:nt. Pa, mg. True. "-.mg. Bru.J,,\

D

11-43

Line o f Business
o ,~Gas hplor

DT

Medusa Corp.

123288

D

\lcCulk>ch OJI

90-126

Od an!Ga, bplor .(ia, Tr.llMll\MOn,Co.tl.Land r>.:,elop.
Al rl10<,. '""'P•pcr

DT

, onh Amcn,an

31 97

\lmcral>. OJI and Ga,. ,\uto Ca,tmg,

D

[ncs..\,c,,n

782 1762

Tekphc>neil·lectron1< Lqu1p. Alarm \~,1,m,

DT

Wlu1,• Con,,.,hdatcd

72~ 2010

Ek<tron1< Lqu1p. \f,1< hmc I ooh, l lou-.. hc>ld ,\pphancos

D

,\VCO

607 19:12

Am.r,1h

DMder Strip,.. "1a,onry

Roy•l1ucs

l·ng10l!,,

llroadta,ung

DT

Gtocral rm:

D

9~1 2110

Rotkct I r,gmcs. I\' R:1<ho Broad,J ung. I ire,. O..·mKals,
PIJ\11<>. Rubb.:r \ktal Produtt,. ,\uto P•n,. ,\thktr<
Produtl\

:116-1

f·rand11"-' Dmc In Re,tJuran1,. \fo\le I hcat<rs

OT

Special!}

D

,\mrcpO,rp

35 7~

DT

Shcli,r R,sources

41 117

D

Deltona Corp

74 119

Con, truct, Sell, I lomcs

OT

Dc,dopmen1 Corp
of America

43 172

Con,truct,,, Sell, lfomc, Alum mum Products

D- D<chrunr Firm
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Sp«1alty Restaurani.-, Rc\lJUrJnl>. Shopping \'rlla,•e,
Con,1ruc 1, Sell, I lomc,. Dl\tr ol \laga11nc,. Book,
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1976- 1985 l utchcd l'nir,

Type

Firm

!,nlc, Rani:e
(\lillSl
R6 IIJ6

D

DT

/\tins Corp

D

Wa,noco o,I

53 109

0,1 Jlld G.h llrillm' l'1r, hno I ,plorJII n l,,
\.110JOl-. I O\ 1ronmcnt C"ontr ll '" I m

D

Ori an<! C,.rs I ,plor I >rrll11w.

()(,an Dulling

D

DT
D

\ktal \lining

011 an<! (JJ, I ,plor. \hnm

DT

DT

I .Inc of lht-,ne"

'N 7 1

\kn\ llothm,

21 Ill

l'h1ldren\ Clollung

I m.·,. l<utitx·r. I uh:s Pl.1.,tk. \1ru.11t Com1, n-..:nh
I \Ol\\ Jf '-1~ rh l'r.xlu,1, f:I <trr<JI Cab!

llunlop I luldme,

I trll!,. Kulltxr l'roJm.ts Pl.hll'-~· ,-11,

DI

\Ul\

\nt:~~flcs. lit u-...:hold \pph.ma.: s, fkm

Supphc,. k.\'1.f1,;.1t1nn I ljlllpllli...nt

D

Ccm nt, (

'\orthW~,ll.:rn St.1k,

Portland ( cmc:nt

11

Ill

,rd n

Oil\. r I..:

s,

D

DI
I)

ln1.:rnJllonJI

I t..llron11. Id
l.qu,pm nt

DI

I{(,\

i(,,nh.. Inti.: rt.urun ·nt l'i,,lud~ I I i..tronh.. I qu1pm.:nt
\hhtar, ,, 1 :m l·uod I r xlu, b
I \ RJ<h"
Br,i.td" .i-.t11w. l'uhlbh11111 \. ,r I< ·nt.tl

[)

\\ hllJ~er Cahl,

DT

Scuthtrn Husmr:ss R«, ICh

I! ~O

-('\,mmun11.•1!1on '\t.111d.1rd

I kl.lr11.

1916-1985 Matched Pairs (continued)

Firm

Type

Sales Range
(Mill$)

Linc o f R11slncss

D

Sentram Lmes

74-788

Boat Trnnsportauon of Petroleum 'Other Products.
Transports Contamen,~d height. Refining and
D1w1bu11on of Petroleum Products

DT

Alexander & Baldwin

336-477

Ocean Transponauon of Goods. i\gncu lture and Food
Produwon. Real h tate Development. Truci,Jng

D

Haw:iiian Atrlmes

68-109

Air Trnm,porta11on

DT

SouthWest J\Jrhn.:s

31-331

Air 'I ram,p,ortat1on

D

UruonGas

463-902

O1str1bu1,on Sak, of Ga,

DT

Laclede Gas

347-674

D1stnbu11on ol C.as

D

TeleCom

51-468

Wholesaler of \lotor height Op,.:r.umn,.
'-'lanuUD1:i.trihut1on ot \..ir comhuomn\?

Equip.. hnam:1al Sc!r\·u.:t~

,..

DT

Actton lndustrtl!S

48-167

Whobakr \1,muf Sdlerol. I limh, are. llouse\\ares.
Flcctncal Items, Garden Arlldes. P.w11PamtSull,t,.,,,.
I oy,

D

Wieboldt

165 1812

Dcp.utml!nt Storc

DT

D,llards

237-711

Di!partmcnt Stor~

D

S1arre11 llousmg

84-217

DT

Standard Pacific

80 266

1980- 1989 Matched Pairs
firm

T)pc

Sales R alll,!C
(Mill$)

Lmc o f Bu'tinc,,

D

Pogo Producmg

121 -296

O1LC,a, hplor

DT

Rowan Corp.

167-273

O,LGa, I ,plor . Contratt Dnllmg

D

Zapata Corp.

147-537

Oil Gas hplor . \far me Services

DT

Bo"' Valley lndust

198-404

O,~Gas Lxplor.. Coal. Dnllmg Equip.

D

Bas,x

88-173

Print, Automauc Toll Systems. Computer Sy,tems.
O1I and Ga, Lxplor. Coal Lxplor

DT

Intemauonal

64-159

Pnnter. !·011 Products. I lolograpluc lmagesBanl-note

-48-

Spnng 1997

. 989 Matched Pairs (conllnucd)
1980 1

Sale, Ra~e

Type

fir m

D

( ~ illi)

1547-1757

Ch:m..:ah. l'Ja,un. Coal ,\lummum, Oat and Gas I ,plor

DT

Alf ProduclJ. and

1420-2132

C"h<mical,, Supplier ol Chem,cab lr,Ju-.malu.L..:s.1'11"- '-'
h1u1p. C."h<m,caJ, l:ngtooermg Serst ~,

D

Sun Co.

%12-15519

O1I and Ga. faplor • Rd1rung, \letal anJ Coal \!,rung.
l',·trokum Pn><luct,,, lndustnal ln,trumenL•. He, uoruc
lnlormauon S.:rs ice,, Real I· state Ix,clop.. 0..ean
I r.ut~fl(•rtJUon ~n u.e

DT

Atlanuc

151~1 25117

011 and Ga, l·,plor Rd,rung. l'euokum l'roJu,L,. \letal
R1<hlield .,nJ Co.ii \hning. Ch,:m,cal,. \1' t.il
I Jt>ncauonCa tong

D

:-IVI Co.

124 1276

St.,.,l l'n><luct,,, \'ukanw·d ht>re, Pla,ucs. Copper Ora"
l'roJucL,, Coal \lmeral \lirung. \!Ju,nal llandlm
Contau'k.·r,

DT

HaMa

DO 1110

\lmmg Rdmmg ol \hnc r.~,. St,:d l'ell, t,, \1,mne ,en 1ccs
Co.ii l:,plor. 011 and C,.h I ,plor. l11.,ur,1n<c Companie,

D

Ideal lla;ic

228 177

DT

Ameron ITll

243 11 1

Co1x:rell·. ('()ITtl!.1on C(introl Produl l~. Cr1n,truu1on

I)

Raytoch

112-1 IJ

l

DT

G.:n..·ral

209 167

R lra..tora.:. Butldmg and Rdra<k•nes Insulating \bt<rt3ls,
J{etrJd,,fll!) hhr.1l10n unJ f 111 r Pnl-\lu1..b. l nc:rg:,
Con"-=n Jlllm Ph)(jui.:b

I)

ITV St.:.,I

3267 l6J0

Sti.,·I. l·n.r\!} ProJud., ''r'\u.:\!'s, ,\,:nhpJi.:~. \.lcJt Jnd h,oJ
l'rodu,i., Ocean Shi('pmg

DI

Inland Steel

299'1 406~

St~l ProJui.:ts. Corn,uu"llon JlnxfUlh, \t...•cl Sh1ppmg
( ontamer,. St-.:ltcr,

Ke},ton.:

l'l~ -101

DT

Co~l"eld

22-1 -161

St,.•d l'nlducL,. \\-<IJ,·J 1 ut>m~

D

Carur Day

22-91

11 ·at.:r,. ,,n.:rat.11>, Bo1k". lndu,u,al Lqu,p, I arm mg
!:.quip

DT

JLG lndustnes

33-121

ll)Jrauhcall; OperJt~d \lachin.:r}, lndusUlal \lach1n.:r>

D

Coru.ohdated

Southtrn Busmtss Rt~tt\\

l'roducl" Lqu,p

rk·rg)' .\h'l(.lrptwn Jnd I ran,m1,~1on Pro<lultS. Cm,tomer

bngane<r J mat,rnah Rl\cts
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1980-1989 Matched Pairs (conUnued)
Sales Range
Type

Firm

(M Iii$)

Line of BusJness

D

Arlen

7-51

Au 10 Accessories. Stri('' Spring Steel. Shopping Cans.
S1ecring Wheels. Dry Woll PanilJons

DT

Van Der Hout

34-43

Shoe~ Absorbers, fahaust P1p.!S, Auio Pans

D

Macrodyne

23-48

Moclured R>rgoo Aerospace Products. Aircraft Engine Pans

DT

S1fco Industries

55-67

AlfCTaft Engines, Aircraft Pans, Po"'er Gcneraung Equip.,
Valves. Bearings. Forged Machine Parts

D

Hudson General

35 I 19

Aircraft Ground I lanthng. Ramp Clcanmg, Fueling, Leases
Railroad F..qu1p., Shoe Mfg. Machmcry, Industrial C'ullmg
Machinery

DT

Offshore Log1rucs

54-151

Opcraies I lchcopiers and fixed "mg aircraft for suppon ,n
011 Drilling, Av1a1Jon mamlcnance and tra1rung/supphes.
\,brine Vessds for Oil Gas Drill mg

D

Acton Corp.

13-177

Cahlc TV Sys1cms. Telephone Equip.. Radio S1auons

DT

Telephone & Da1a

99240

Local Telephone Opcrouons, Radio Pagmg. Cellu lar
Telephones. CablcTelcv1s1on

Peter A. Stanwick 1s an ass,srnnt professor of management at Auburn Umvcrsny.
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